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grantor has not retained sufficient controls to be considered owner of the
corpus.
The real significance of the Perry decision lies in tie advice the
Fourth Circuit has given tax planners. While the transfer and leaseback
of business property to a Clifford trust remains a tax savings device, the
court will demand strict compliance with two requirements. First, the
Fourth Circuit will apply the business purpose test at the time of the
transfer into trust. The retention of no reversion by the settlor and the
existence of trust income other than the settlor's rental payments will be
considered factors showing real business purpose. Second, the court will
look past the identity of the trustee and will focus on his actual independence, indicated by his ability to protect and further the beneficiaries'
interests, to determine whether the settlor has properly relinquished
control over the corpus. It is hoped that the Fourth Circuit's clear
articulation of the standards it will require in the transfer and leaseback
situation will provide needed predictability to those prospective grantors
who seek to avail themselves of this tax savings device.
CARL N. PATTERSON, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-The Abstention Doctrine as Amended by
Hicks v. Miranda: A Legal Definition and Ominous Omissions
The abstention doctrine1 is a judicial device designed to reduce the
tensions inherent in our dual system of government. The doctrine allows
federal courts to defer to state courts and thus to avoid unnecessary
2
confrontation when federal and state jurisdictions overlap. Significantly, the impact of abstention extends beyond the procedural level to affect
fundamental substantive rights.' Thus, in sensitive substantive areas,4
1. One commentator speaks of "abstention doctrines" since there are several
distinguishable lines of cases. C. Wmrr, HANDBOOK Op LAw OF FnDnJ4L CouRis § 52
(2d ed. 1970).
2. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Kurland,
Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481, 487 (1959); Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Developments, 46 TuL. L. PIv. 762, 763 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); H. FRmNDLY,
FEDERAL JrmsDIcroN: A GENERAL Vinw 87-88 (1973); Maraist, Federal Intervention
in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TExAS L REV.
1324, 1326-27 (1972).
4. Civil rights litigation is a particularly sensitive area in which courts have
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abstention has become a volatile concept, expanded or compressed to
reflect particular predilections of the federal judiciary.5
In Hicks v. Miranda6 the United States Supreme Court focused on
the scope of abstention and defined one of the situations in which the
doctrine must be applied by the federal courts. The divided Court held
that, absent extraordinary circumstances or bad faith and harassment,
abstention is mandatory when a state criminal proceeding is initiated
against a federal plaintiff after the federal complaint is filed but before
any "proceeding of substance on the merits" has occurred in the federal
forum. 7
The abstention issue was raised in the federal district courts when
Vincent Miranda brought suit against local authorities for declaratory
and injunctive relief from enforcement of the California obscenity statute." As president and a stockholder of Pussycat Theatre,10 Miranda
sought to assert his first amendment right to present the film "Deep
Throat" without fear of prosecution under the allegedly unconstitutional
state statute. At the time of filing, no criminal prosecution was pending
against Miranda in state court; however, local authorities had already
seized copies of the film and box office receipts on four separate occasions and had criminally charged two employees of the theatre. Before a
hearing on the merits could be had in federal court, the state criminal
complaint was amended to include Miranda as an additional party
defendant."1
Relief was granted by the three judge"2 district court which applied
the classic, three-pronged, "equity, comity, and federalism" analysis to
the question of abstention. The court held the abstention doctrine
reached contradictory conclusions concerning the appropriateness of abstention. Compare Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. Wallace, 362 F. Supp. 682, 685 (M.D. Ala. 1973) with
Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173, 176-77 (D. Conn. 1972), a! 'd, 411 U.S. 941
(1973). See generally McCormack, Federalism and Section. 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalClaims, PartII, 60 VA. L.REv. 250 (1974).
5. Kennedy & Schoonover, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the
Burger Court, 26 Sw. LJ. 282 (1972); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice
Frankfurter'sDoctrine in an Activist Era,80 HARv. L.REv. 604, 607-08 (1967).
6. 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975).
7. Id. at 2292.
8. Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 2281
(1975).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). The complaint also sought
relief from the search warrant provisions of the statute. Id. §§ 1523-42.
10. 95 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2.
11. Id. at 2287.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). This statute requires a three-judge court when
injunction is sought against enforcement of a state statute which is challenged on
constitutional grounds.
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inapplicable under the circumstances on the grounds that no adequate
state remedy was available to protect Miranda's first amendment right,
that no criminal prosecution was pending against him in state court, and
that the facts demonstrated bad faith and harassment. 13
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court,1 4 five justices'15 joined to
reverse the lower court decision over the objection of a vigorous dissent.' 6 Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that, in the
interests of comity alone, abstention is required to "'permit the state
courts to try cases free from interference by federal court.' ,17 Furthermore, the Court held that the "pending" criterion should be liberally
construed so that the abstention doctrine is not "trivialized" by rigid
adherence to an arbitrary date. 8 Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent criticized
the majority's "pending" standard as failing to reflect countervailing
policy considerations founded on the role of the federal courts "as the
'primary reliances' for vindicating constitutional freedoms."'
In order to evaluate the Court's ruling in Hicks, it is necessary to
place the central issue of the case in historical perspective. The fountainhead of the abstention doctrine, Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co.,20 illustrated the judicial effort to reverse the trend toward
federal intervention which had been authorized by the landmark decision Ex Parte Young.' Justice Frankfurter's opinion for a unanimous
Court, which came to be known as the Pullman Doctrine, imposed limits
on the federal judiciary which were designed to "avoid the waste of a
tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication. 22
Subsequent decisions interpreted the scope of Pullman abstention
and established the presumption in favor of the exercise of federal
jurisdiction when a federal question is raised.23 Since the hazards of
13. 388 F. Supp. at 360.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) authorizes an appeal directly to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of a three-judge court concerning the constitutionality of a state statute.
15. Justices White, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger joined
in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger also filed a concurring statement.
16. Justice Stewart was joined in the dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Douglas.
17. 95 S.Ct. at 2292, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
18. 95 S.Ct. at 2292.
19. Id. at 2295.
20. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The majority opinion by Justice Peckham held that
federal courts may enjoin state officials from enforcing a state statute that is constitutionally defective on its face.
22. 312 U.S. at 500.
23. The federal court exercises jurisdiction unless the state law is both unclear and
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abstention 4 in cases presenting constitutional issues often counterbalance the harm of interference, the lower federal courts were directed to
exercise jurisdiction unless the state law in question was both unclear
and susceptible to an interpretation that would avoid constitutional
adjudication.2 5 Thus the abstention doctrine was characterized as a
narrow exception to the general rule.
An overview of the abstention cases indicates that the applicability
of the doctrine is generally determined by a balancing approach rather
than by application of precise rules. 8 Using this technique, a court
identifies the federal and state policies that abstention will serve and
assigns weights according to the relative significance of each. A line of
cases outside the Pullman27 mainstream indicates that the presumption
of exercise of federal jurisdiction shifts when the countervailing state
interest reaches the level of importance associated with a "State's goodfaith administration of its criminal laws." 28 In the criminal context, the
burden is on the federal plaintiff to justify intervention with a requisite
showing of irreparable injury.29
Civil rights litigation precipitated a doctrinal dilemma in this area80
which was reconciled in one way by Dombrowski v. Pfister"' and in
another by Younger v. Harris.2 The Supreme Court in Dombrowski
held that imminent state criminal proceedings may be enjoined in two
situations: (1) when the state criminal statute infringes first amendment
susceptible to an interpretation that will avoid the federal constitutional question. Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972); Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534 (1965); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 PA. L REv. 1071, 1088 (1974).
24. The adverse consequences of abstention in terms of delay, expense, and
personal liberties are pointed out by Justice Douglas' dissent in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960): "Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly
afford one lawsuit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals
is a sure way of defeating the ends of justice." Id. at 228.
25. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
26. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Maraist, supra
note 3 at 1332-34.
27. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) dealt with a situation
in which no criminal prosecution was pending or even threatened.
28. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
29. A single prosecution does not constitute "irreparable injury." Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943).
30. Ironically, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which
introduced the abstention doctrine, contained the issue of racial discrimination which
subsequently produced doctrinal crisis. Note, 80 HARaV. L. Rnv, supra note 5, at 607.
31. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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guaranties and is overbroad or vague on its face; or (2) when officials
employ the statute in a manner that indicates bad faith harassment. 33
Narrowing the potential scope of Dombrowski, the Court in Younger
ruled that when criminal prosecution is pending in state court, federal
judges may not justify injunctive relief solely on first amendment
grounds but rather must find either bad faith harassment or extraordi34
nary circumstances.
Significantly, the narrower holdings in Younger and its companion
cases 35 extended only to situations in which state criminal prosecutions
were pending.3 6 When prosecution was merely threatened, the Dombrowski holding remained intact.3 7 The rationale in support38 of the
pivotal distinction appeared in a later case, Steffel v. Thompson:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice
system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to
enforce constitutional principles. 9
Although the Court in SteHel addressed itself solely to a request for
declaratory judgment,40 the rationale is equally applicable to the appropriateness of injunctive relief when prosecution is threatened but not
pending in state court.
In Hicks the Court ignored the logic of Steffel and decided the case
on the basis of a novel definition. The majority held that "pending"
speaks to the time of "proceedings of substance on the merits" rather
than to the date of filing in federal court. 4 The Court assumed without
discussion that the differentiation between "pending" and "threatened"
is an arbitrary distinction. This assumption is contrary2 to the rationale,
although not to the precise holdings, of prior decisions.1
33. 380 U.S. at 489-90.
34. 401 U.S. at 41. See also Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Younger v. Harris: A
Current Appraisal of the Policy against Federal Court Interference with State Court
Proceedings,21 DE PAuL L. REv.519, 539 (1971).
35. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
36. 401 U.S. at 41. A possible exception is Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81
(1971), but the decision was primarily based on lack of standing rather than on the
abstention doctrine since plaintiffs failed to allege that they were threatened.
37. Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974).
38. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
39. Id. at 462.
40. Id.
41. 95 S. Ct. at 2292.
42. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.

252

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

It is significant that the Court arrived at its definition with only
tangential regard for the balancing approach and its classic, threepronged inquiry. Justice White considered only the comity factor. 43 He
concluded that the state interest was paramount in this case and that the
harm of intervention outweighed the harm of abstention.14 Implicit in
this approach is a trend toward greater deference to the state courts.
The dangers inherent in the Court's approach can be expressed in
terms of equity and federalism, principles ignored by the majority
opinion. The crux of the equity analysis in abstention problems is
adequacy of state remedy. If the federal plaintiff has already violated a
criminal statute, his defense to prosecution constitutes an adequate state
remedy. 45 However, if a person is only threatened by state law, he may
be placed in the untenable position described in Steffel as "between the
Scylla of intentionally flounting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to
avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding."'4" The Court in
Hicks failed to note this practical consequence, which was precisely the
situation faced by Miranda as president of the theatre.
Federalism, the second classic consideration overlooked by the
Court, concerns the proper relationship of the federal and state governments. Chief Justice Marshall once emphasized the importance of federal jurisdiction in solemn dicta: "We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
47
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."
Marshall's statement is clearly not the modem rule." Confined by the
realities of the federal system-a limited number of judges and an ever
expanding case load-federal courts frequently decline to exercise jurisdiction.
However as guarantors of constitutional freedoms, the federal
courts may not abdicate responsibility to the states but rather must assess other realities. In certain sensitive legal areas state courts may be
452, 462 (1974). See generally Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the
Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72
CoLuM. L. REV. 874 (1972).
43. 95 S. Ct. at 2292.
44. Id.
45. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943).
46. 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
47. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
48. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 52 at 196.
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unwilling to vindicate federal constitutional claims. In light of the
court's function as fact finder, the need for a sympathetic forum and an
independent judiciary is paramount under such circumstances. 49 Direct
review to the Supreme Court cannot be expected to correct all the
nuances of factfinding that may prejudice the lower court determination.
Unless the court weighs all the factors and makes a deliberate effort to
strike a balance, the institutional goal of comity may engulf the primary
function of the federal courts as the guarantors of the individual's
constitutional rights.50
The significance of the Hicks definition of "pending" lies in its
impact on functional analysis of abstention problems. Traditionally, the
threshold question is whether the case should be classified under the
Pullman or the Younger line of authority. This determination is crucial
in light of the corresponding presumption regarding jurisdiction which
attaches. 5 In the absence of state criminal proceedings, the former
category is appropriate. According to Ste fel,52 federal courts are not
required to abstain unless criminal prosecution is actually pending in
state court and not merely threatened. If pending, the strictures of
Younger5" apply unless the federal plaintiff can comply with the requirements of one of the narrow exceptions.54
The practicil effect of broadening the scope of the "pending"
criterion in Hicks is virtually to eliminate the distinction betWeen pending and threatened prosecutions because state authorities can easily
transform the latter into the former.55 Thus the definitional approach
adopted by the Court effectively negates much of the holding in Ste fel
without the attendant embarrassment of overruling such a recent decision. The corollary to the broader definition of "pending' in Hicks is
growth of the doctrinal branch in which abstention is the rule and not
the exception.
While Hicks clearly broadens the scope of Younger abstention, it
fails to introduce certainty into doctrinal analysis. As pointed out in the
49. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436
OF DVisIoN OF JuEIsDIcnoN BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDmuL CoURTS 168 (1969); Gibert, Questions Unanswered by the February
Sextet, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 14, 20.
50. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 239 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1961).
51. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
52. 415 U.S. 452.

(1964) (Douglas, J.,concurring); ALI Srtuy

53. 401 U.S. 37.
54. Id. at 41.
55. 95 S.Ct. at 2296 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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dissent, the new "pending" standard announced by the majority 50is
marred by imprecise terminology that will make it difficult to apply.
Since the Court neglected to provide guidelines, determination of what
constitutes "proceedings of substance on the merits"5 will be governed
by subjective rather than objective factors. The foreseeable result is an
array of contradictory lower court opinions.
Notably, the Court in Hicks also failed to clarify the outer limits of
Younger abstention. The Younger exceptions provide a potential safety
valve for plaintiffs who satisfy the rigorous burden of proof by showing
either bad faith harassment or extraordinary circumstances. 8 The clause
is phrased in the disjunctive and presumably provides two means of
escape. Although the Court has never precisely defined the latter exception, it indicated in Younger that multiple prosecutions might rise to the
level of extraordinary circumstances. 5 9 However, the Court in Hicks did
not find the four separate seizures and subsequent charges to be sufficiently extraordinary to justify federal intervention." Bad faith harassment is an equally elusive concept. The lack of objective standards to
guide the lower federal courts portends uneven application of the
Younger exceptions. In light of the significant substantive questions that
may be at stake in federal constitutional cases, uncertainty in the abstention doctrine is ground for practical as well as theoretical concern.
In the final analysis, the Court's definitional approach is the fundamental flaw of Hicks. Assuming that the purpose of a definition is to
clarify, the opinion is a paradox, for it generates more questions and
uncertainties than answers. The Court's focus on a single word represents a radical departure from the comprehensiveness of the balancing
approach to abstention problems. Concern for definitional detail seems
particularly inappropriate in the context of basic policy considerations
that were ignored by the Court. In light of doctrinal impact on individual plaintiffs as well as on the entire federal scheme, abstention may be "a
custom [m]ore honored in the breach than the observance."'
SARA MCPEAIE GILKEY
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2294n.1.
Id. at 2292.
401 U.S. at 41.
Id. at 46.
95 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
W. SHAKxPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, sc. iv, 11. 15-16.

